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Introduction
In 1998 a new research and technological development (RTD) policy programme was created in Austria, which was radically different from previous policy measures. This initiative, the Competence Centre Programme "K+", was not new by international standards -indeed it was strongly influenced by predecessors in other OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, such as Canada and Sweden. Yet for Austrian RTD policy making it meant a radical innovation in the sense that the new policy instrument not only was large by Austrian standards, but also that it was more complex than any RTD, innovation or industry policy measure hitherto. Moreover the process leading to the K+ Programme was quite unusual for Austrian RTD politics, because it carried not much resemblance with the otherwise dominant style of policy making. Hitherto in Austrian RTD politics the other RTD ministries, various federal actors, external experts and the social partners were included in intricate discussion processes. These resembled the policy-style developed in other policy fields in the framework of neo-corporatist political arrangementsthe Austrian social partnership of cooperation between employers' and employees' organisations (Karlhofer/Talos 1999, Talos/Kittel 2001).
All of these qualities -high complexity, new style of policy making, different type of policy instrument -make the K+ Programme as one of the harbingers of change foreboding the rearrangement of the Austrian RTD policy sub-system through the new university law (Universitätsgesetz 2002) , the research-and technology promotion law (Forschungs-und Technologieförderungsgesetz 1982 , changed 2004 , the Austrian research promotion agency establishment law (Österreichisches Forschungsförderungsgesellschaft Errichtungsgesetz 2004 ) and the research promotion structural reform law (Forschungsförderungsstrukturreformgesetz 2004) . The role of the K+ Programme is all the more important as it was quickly perceived as a success story (OECD 2004 , Edler et al 2004 and served as a model for other policy programmes on the national as well as the international level. Similarly the creation of an independent agency at arm's length from government, the Technologie Impulse Gesellschaft (TIG), with the main task of managing the K+ Programme, created a point of reference for Austrian RTD policy making in the 2000s. This paper tries to answer the question why a major policy innovation such as the K+ Programme was possible in an RTD policy subsystem, which before rejected changes for a prolonged period of time. It is also interested in the question how the policy developed in the following years, marked by frequent and encompassing changes in the Austrian RTD system. In an attempt to answer these questions the paper analyses the policy process leading up to the K+ Programme beginning from the first half of the 1990ies, when the idea of having competence centres in which science and industry would work together in the form of public-private-partnerships first came on the political agenda. Further analysis pertains to policy making procedures in the second half of the 1990ies, the creation of the K+ The analysis will be carried out from the perspective of policy-oriented learning, or "policy learning" in short. Since the 1980s there has been an increasing proliferation of policy learning studies. Two reasons can be identified accounting for the rise in studies using the concept of policy learning.
First, the changes of policies are linked to an increased internationalisation and transnationalisation of politics, which, amongst a variety of other consequences, leads to policy-makers' heightened awareness of the actions of other politicians. This tendency is further increased by institutional solutions such as the open method of coordination of the EU or the various exercises of the policy groups of the OECD, which are supposed not only to enhance policy transfer and learning, but also to establish norms for policies and policy development.
Second, social scientists have increasingly become aware of the limitations of the traditional approaches, which not only are often based upon the traditional categories of policy analysis, interest, power and representation, but which are also in many cases contingent on the usage of (often strictly) rational models of policy-making.
Several approaches have been developed utilising the notion of policy learning, with different conceptualisations of actors, places and fora of learning, reflected in concepts such as policy diffusion (Bennett 1991 , Drori et al 2003 , transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000 , Page 2000 , De Jong et al 2002 , learning (Hall 1993 , Sabatier 1998 , Bandelow 2005 , Griessler/Hadolt 2006 and lesson-drawing (Rose 1993) . 1 The approaches utilising the policy learning notion proper share a conviction that the actions of policymakers can be explained by understanding those actions in terms of feedback cycles the actors use in order to assess their previous actions. Policymakers engage in learning in order to gain a better understanding of their experiences and to arrive at better decisions in the future. 1 For overviews see Page 2000 , Bandelow 2003 Although there is a consensus on these basic ingredients of the notion of policy learning, no generally accepted standard definition of the term has been developed as of now. The definition utilised here is the following: "policy learning" stands for the production of policy relevant knowledge, skills or attitudes, which are the result of the assessment of other policies.
Thus learning does not have to lead to a change of action, but may just entail a confirmation of what has been done or planned. Changes may therefore stay on the cognitive level -an actor may see his or her role different than before the cognitive process of learning started, he or she may justify his or her position differently or he or she may arrive differently at these justifications.
Furthermore, learning does not have to be based on some kind of strict evaluation that typically might be explicit, systematic and planned, although this may well be the case.
Learning, as understood here, may be a relatively unsystematic act, happen alongside other daily practices, as for example in the case of "learning by doing".
Actors follow a bounded rationality (Simon 1957) , they have limited resources and have to live with sub optimal solutions due to their limited cognitive and material resources, this giving rise to satisficing behaviour in which they also may accept "second-best" solutions in order to preserve scarce resources such as time. Moreover, they can draw the "wrong" lessons, again because of limited resources, but also due to unclear information situations or inappropriate frameworks of interpretation.
This has several consequences for the observation and the ensuing analysis of learning.
Most importantly, it is not possible to observe learning directly -a difficulty the concept shares with other social science notions and which has been discussed elsewhere (May 1992 . Research on policy learning therefore has to resort to explaining political action by closely analysing actions and their justification and interpretations by the actors as well as looking at the knowledge resources utilised in order to draw inferences on the existence and nature of policy learning.
With all the concentration upon the factor learning, it is important not to forget about the aforementioned more traditional categories of social science such as power, representation and interests. Without taking into account power relations between policy actors -visible and invisible (Bachrach/Baratz 1962 , Digeser 1992 -it is not possible to arrive at a sensible interpretation of political actions. Policy learning takes place before and in the framework of power relations: sometimes it is even driven by these (Braun/Benninghoff 2003) .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: First, a description of agenda setting, policy finding and making, implementation and assessment of the K+ Programme is to take place.
Then an analysis of the specifics and origins of knowledge utilised in the policy process will be carried out, combined with an account of different elements of policy learning found. As part of the last section the original research questions will be revisited.
The Austrian RTD System in the 1990ies

Three Policy Initiatives
In 1994 and 1995 a group of national experts from the Austrian Research Centre Seibersdorf (ARCS, Österreichisches Forschungszentrum Seibersdorf), Joanneum Research and the Economic Research Institute (Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitut, WIFO) had worked out a new technology policy concept that should replace the policy paper stemming from 1989, which was understood as too vague and not up to date. In 1996 the new concept was adopted by the Austrian government (BMWV 1996) . One goal stipulated by the technology policy concept of 1996 was the strengthening of the cooperation between science and industry in Austria, which was seen as underdeveloped in Austria. Different versions of the policy paper had been circulating for almost two years. It had been debated among the social partners, representatives of the major research funds, civil servants from the science and technology related ministries and a number of other actors in the field.
At the same time the paper "Knowledge as a Factor of Production" ("Produktionsfaktor Wissen", Stampfer 1996) had been produced by a small group of civil servants in the newly created Federal Ministry for Science, Transport and the Arts (Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft, Verkehr und Kunst, BMWVK), which had been formed out of the Federal Ministry for the Public Economy and Transport (Bundesministerium für öffentliche Wirtschaft und Verkehr, BMöWV) and the Federal Ministry for Science and Research (Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und Forschung, BMWF). The main person advancing the paper was a young ministry official who had taken the initiative to start a process involving a number of persons from different institutions of the Austrian science and technology system (interview 3-5). The background for these discussions was that the Austrian government had targeted a technology initiative as part of which a milliard Schilling ("Die Technologiemilliarde", approximately 70 million Euro) was to be used for financing new RTD policy measures in 1997 and 1998.
In the course of the discussion process a number of deficiencies of the Austrian RTD policies became issues of the debate. By this time both civil servants and researchers were disillusioned by the available RTD policy instruments in Austria. In the mid-1990ies RTD policies in Austria were still using mainly institutional and project funding. The main problem of institutional funding, as seen from the ministry, was that it entailed no element of political steering. There was no way to make this kind of funding conditional. The main problem of project funding for the ministry was that it caused high administrative costs, especially compared with the quite small sums of money allocated. Under the conditions of the mid1990ies both instruments, institutional and project funding, were plagued by a lack of funding. This was also true for the few programmes that existed at this time, which were all bundled in the Innovation and Technology Fund (Innovations-und Technologiefonds, ITF; compare Biegelbauer 2005b ). Yet not only the BMWVK but also the researchers at the universities and, even more so, the researchers at the extra-university institutions were not satisfied with the situation. Whilst the ministry officials wanted an instrument to structure the Austrian RTD system, the researchers wanted to have a longer planning horizon in order to engage in larger projects. For the first time in the Austrian discussion on RTD policy, the paper "Knowledge as a Factor of Production" used the term competence centre for such a policy instrument combining treats of basic funding and project financing (Stampfer 1996, 9) .
Competence centres for transport technologies, cleaner production and others are mentioned by name. Although the instrument was largely under defined, already by then it was clear that competence centres should be a cooperative RTD policy instrument in which different kinds of institutions, such as universities, extra-university research institutions, polytechniques and corporations should work together. There should be diverse funding sources, including the federal government, industry and the states (Länder).
In the first months of 1996 the coalition government between the two largest parties, the social democrats and the conservatives, was renewed following the elections from 1995. In March 1996 a coalition agreement addressed the RTD policy field with a number of measures, including a raise in the level of RTD activities of the Austrian economy, the utilisation of a part of the privatisation profits for RTD initiatives, as well as an increase in the cooperation between research and industry (Stampfer 1996, 11) . In general the issue of RTD policy received more attention than in previous years, which was reflected in the fact that during this time RTD policy measures were discussed in parliament, something hitherto had rarely happened before. four months later. The paper criticised that although RTD were important factors of production and influenced the competitiveness of modern economies, the decision making structures of the Austrian RTD system were so disparate that the creation of a comprehensive strategy for RTD seemed not to be possible. and so an inter-ministerial working group was established to further discuss these issues, a step described by an interview partner as a "funeral, first class" (interview 3-4). Indeed, for the time being, this was the end of the Schmidt-Hochleitner initiative.
Radical Innovation: The K+ Programme
In September increase their RTD expenditures, which were found to be quite low in Austria at that time.
The K+ Programme should promote the cooperation between academia and industry and "therefore foster the competitiveness of both, the Austrian economy and its science system."
(BMWV 1997, II) Canada and Australia were cited as countries which have put in place similar centres and which were operating quite successfully. Yet the policy paper also states that adjustments had been made to these international examples in order to reflect the "specific characteristics of the Austrian innovation system" (BMWV 1997). The paper proposed to establish 20 competence centres, which should be based on partnerships between universities, industry and the government. In these centres researchers from universities and companies should work together, financed by public funds up to 60 % with the private sector adding the rest of the budget.
One of the innovative assets of the proposed programme was that the selection procedures for the centres were to be strictly based on a set of criteria, which was to be published well before and which would form the basis of a two-stage process. In the first stage only a small paper would have to be handed in, whilst in the second stage a full-fledged proposal would be evaluated. The selection would be based on international peer-review processes only.
Furthermore foreign companies would be invited to take part in the centres so as to ensure that these were embedded in an international and competitive environment. The policy paper extensively elaborates the criteria after which the K+-Centres should be chosen and evaluated. Of foremost importance were the extent and the quality of the industrial participation, the research programme of the centres and the organisational and management plans. Several independent firms were to participate in one centre together with research institutions. This cooperation should not only entail common RTD work, but should also include the training of young researchers and the exchange of personnel. The selection committee which should fell a decision upon reviews should consist of scientific peers, experts from the business sector and professional evaluators.
The centres were to consist of 25 to 60 persons after an initial growth-phase of three years, which should end with an evaluation of the centre. In case of positive evaluation further funding should be granted for four more years. After these seven years a second seven year term could be applied for -a clause later dropped. The paper also advanced a pilot scheme as part of which a handful of candidates should be hand-picked on the basis of fully developed proposals so that the competence centre programme would be adjusted where necessary. It stated that a catalogue of goals, which should be the basis for an evaluation of the programme and which should also contain output-oriented elements, would be written. Approximately 50 % of the policy paper dealt with the way in which the competence centres should be selected and there the largest part again was chapter 4, on the criteria for the selection of competence centres. An elaborate set of criteria had been set up: the goals of the centre, its proponents, its research competence, connections to science and companies, its RTD programme, the development of human resources, internationality, structure, finance, organisation and management. During this process of constructing the policy paper, which then was the basis for the competence centre's programme, study travels were made by a small group consisting of experts from the TIP Programme and officials from the Another explanation might be that after the discussions on the Schmidt-Hochleitner paper in 1997, which asked for nothing less than the complete dismantling and rearrangement of the political institutions governing the Austrian RTD system and the ensuing resistance of a number of ministerial players on the level of ministers as well as on the level of civil servants, it was comparatively easier to "sell" a large scale programme, which by itself did not necessitate a rearrangement of ministerial competencies and the funding of intermediary agencies.
A third element of an explanation might address the strategy of the policy entrepreneurs from the Ministry for Science and Transport, which deviated from the policy style typical for the Austrian RTD policy in the 1980ies and 1990ies and therefore caught other actors by surprise. Indeed the ministry officials did not invite other ministries, most importantly the Ministry for Economic Affairs, to discuss the establishment of the new programme but went ahead with a small group consisting mainly of experts from intermediary agencies and the social partners. Even in this process there was a core group which drafted the policy document and which consisted only of a handful of persons, the young policy entrepreneur from the Ministry for Science and Transport and a few experts from extra-university research institutions, which were part of the TIP Programme. At the time when the policy paper was presented to other actors in the Austrian RTD system, not only was the programme already fully worked out, but the ministerial actors were not ready to change the planned programme on a large scale anymore.
A final explanation would take into account that one of the central problems of Austrian RTD policy until the mid-1990ies, the dearth for funding, did not apply to the K+ Programme.
When the programme was already in its pilot phase, an opportunity arose to fund the new initiative for a longer period of time. The Austrian federal railway (Österreichische Bundesbahnen, ÖBB) had sold off their network of glass fibre cables to the German company Mannesmann, who wanted to use it for telecommunication purposes. After negotiations with officials from the Ministry of Finance and the Federal Chancellery, the Minister for Science and Transport decided to use the lion's share of these funds for the first two calls of the K+ Programme. Therefore the new policy measure was independent from the regular federal budget and the inter-ministerial haggling over funding.
Another problem waiting to be solved was the question where the new programme should be situated. Already during 1998 the decision was taken that the programme should be not carried out inside the Ministry for Science and Transport, but that the management of the initiative should be the task of an independent agency. An already existent organisation, the Economic Park Development Agency (Wirtschaftsparkentwicklungsgesellschaft, WEG) was transformed into the Technology Impulse Society (Technologie Impulse Gesellschaft, TIG). In the area of Austrian RTD policy it was the first independent operative agency that would initiate programmes and guidelines, engage into projects and feature a very specific mission, which was to manage cooperative research programmes. into a plan to construct its own competence centres programmes. These efforts were successful and led to the establishment of the K ind industrial competence centres and K net competence networks. The K ind and K net Programme also served the development of technology clusters and both were run by business enterprises and research institutions in the same time frames as the K+ Programme.
Besides the general aim and the idea proposed in the cooperation between science and industry a lot of other similarities can be found between the competence centre programmes stemming from the Ministry for Science and Transport and the Ministry for Economic Affairs.
Examples are the development of know how to increase the chances of Austrian actors in international RTD programmes, the combination of resources in order to build critical masses for industrial RTD as well as the stimulation of private funding for RTD (Edler et al 2004) .
Nevertheless there are differences between these programmes, too: the K+ Programme is much more formalized and structured, whereas K ind and K net are less formalized; K+ is stronger knowledge driven and seeks the promotion of excellence in research, whereas K ind , K net are stronger industry driven and interested more in technology transfer; K+ requires the establishment of new structures, with the majority of researchers being concentrated at one physical location, whereas K ind , K net may consist of virtual centres and networks.
In light of the strong similarities between the two programmes, the question arises why they coexist in the comparatively small Austrian RTD system. And once again the main reason seems to be the institutional set-up of the Austrian RTD system, one of which's characteristics is that several ministries share the competencies for RTD. Apparently there were efforts from the side of the Ministry for Economic Affairs to fuse the programme ideas of K+ and K ind , which had been blocked by the Minister for Economic Affairs, Hannes 
Policy Relevant Knowledge and Learning
The ITF Record
The creation of knowledge is a historically contingent social process in as that new knowledge always builds on and relates to older knowledge. This becomes especially apparent in the case of the establishment of the K+ Programme. Indeed this policy initiative hardly can be understood without taking into account the history of Austrian RTD policy, especially the experiences made by Austrian policy actors with the ITF. Whilst the ITF 4 The Council for Research and Technological Development was established with the year 2000 as an independent body advising the government on its research and technology strategy. Although it is in name identical to the organisation suggested by the Schmidt-Hochleitner Paper in 1997, it is less powerful than its virtual predecessor as it can only suggest policy measures.
certainly was not an efficient instrument of RTD policy, and only in some cases was an effective one, it was an important policy tool around which policy learning took place during the 1990ies in Austria (Biegelbauer 2005b ). The first lesson Austrian RTD policy actors learned from the ITF was that neither ministries nor intermediary agencies could expect any deeper interest in the policy field from the side of politicians. This insight led actors from both ministries and intermediary agencies to regularly take the matter into their own hands when it came to create a new policy initiative.
Second, the history of the ITF made it all too clear that the lack of funding in RTD policy was there to stay. The hopes that at one point larger sums of money would be available to develop larger and more complex RTD policy programmes had subsided for most, if not all, policy actors by the mid-1990ies. It was the first two issues, the marginal interest of politicians in the policy field and the lack of money, which had fostered the coordination problems between the different ministerial actors, which not only included the science, transport, and economics ministries in their varying constellations and set-ups, but also the Ministry of Finance and the Federal Chancellery.
Third, the two issues mentioned first also invited the creation of different allotments or fiefdoms in the policy area, which had been created and were fiercely defended by ministerial actors. It was very difficult to break through the mistrust hindering cooperative activities between high-ranking ministry officials on a larger scale. All of this led to a further increase in the short-termism of Austrian RTD policy, with ministerial actors often engaging rather into tactics and not into strategies.
The fourth characteristic of Austrian RTD politics in the 1990ies was that it featured a policy style which had come into existence due to the prevalence of the Austrian neo-corporatist social partnership. Political decisions were often made in the framework of networks which, besides central ministerial actors and a small number of experts not only included social partners, but were made in the very style in which decisions came into being in the framework of policy fields dominated by the social partnership. Such decision finding and making procedures frequently included little codification, often informal meetings of a relatively small number of decision makers under exclusion of experts, which were not directly part of the closely knit policy networks.
Put differently, it was mainly two lessons which were learned by policy actors from the ITF record: First, there was lots of learning of how (not) to run RTD programmes. Repeatedly interview partners pointed out how important the ITF was in the sense that actors could learn how to identify problems, write policy documents or evaluate programmes -including the possibility to fail in their initiatives (interviews 2-1, 3-5, 2-8, 2-9, 2-10). 5 Secondly, policy actors learned that the ITF was not the right instrument for making successful RTD policies in a systematic and efficient way. The latter point was not only a reoccurring theme in interviews, but was driven home by one interview partner, who spoke of his impression, "that many people have almost experienced … a trauma, insofar as productive work for 10 years [in the ITF, PB] was very difficult." (interview 3-5).
(Trans)National Expert Communities and (International) Organisations
Several older policy papers were formative for the competence centre programmes. The most important of these, the Technology Policy Concept (BMWVK 1996) , as well as "Knowledge as a Factor of Production" (Stampfer 1996) In other policy areas the effect of the OECD has been described as much more direct. An example has been provided by a former official from the Ministry of Finance, who said that the regular contacts with OECD working groups caused the Austrian representatives to upgrade their knowledge to -higher -international standards in the 1970ies and 1980ies
(interview 2-8).
The Austrian EU accession in 1995 had a more immediate impact. It affected not only civil servants with international leanings inside ministries and experts from research institutions, as had been the case with the OECD, but also all the other ministry officials and policy experts due to the effects of the acqui communautaire on Austrian law and the binding nature of many of the agreements being struck in the very working groups and council meetings Austrian representatives were taking part in. Even although the EU activities were not taken serious by all ministerial staff at the beginning of the Austrian membership (interviews 3-5, 1-1), the effects of a large number of civil servants going to Brussels and coming back with new impressions and papers based upon other working styles and administrative traditions were being felt immediately. Knowledge on the way in which RTD policy programmes were made in other countries, the ways in which they were implemented and evaluated, began to seep into the workings of the ministerial machineries starting with the international departments responsible for working with the European Union from early on. As one former ministry official observes, "policy developments in the national arena are often pushed forward via real or supposed 'Brussels' or 'European' standards, no bench remains unmarked. Ministry mandarins go to European meetings with their agendas in mind and come home with a kind of conviction that something must be changed in their country due to the 'standards' mentioned" (Stampfer 2003) .
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The effects of international organisations and transnational networks emanating from these are therefore twofold: International organisations reach into national RTD systems, such as the Austrian one, via the knowledge they offer and which is taken and proceeded through policy actors from national ministries, intermediary agencies and policy experts from research institutes and consultancies. They also have a more direct effect on actors in providing platforms in which experts exchange experiences and opinions, sometimes under the tutelage of the international organisation, sometimes based on their own initiative.
In the case of the establishment of the K+ Programme these international experiences were supplemented by a more direct knowledge transfer from three countries with ample knowledge on the policy instrument envisaged by the Austrian policy makers. Already in 1996, well before the K+ Programme was on its way, two professors from the technical universities of Vienna and Graz, Skalitzky and Kahlert, had been to Australia, where they had visited Australian Cooperative Research Centres, existing since 1990. Upon returning to Austria, the two professors, who were in different functions well entrenched in the Austrian RTD policy community, wrote a report, which they sent out freely, praising the Australian Competence Centre Programme.
Two years later, already during the writing of the policy document for the K+ Programme, a group of policy experts and ministry officials travelled to Sweden and Canada in order to analyse the Swedish Competence Centres Programme, which had been set up in 1995, and the Canadian Networks of Centres of Excellence Programme, which was running since 1989. A year later, already during the pilot phase of the K+ Programme, a last and most extensive study visit was made to Australia. There was a consensus amongst interview partners that these trips had been worthwhile, as they had led to a marked increase in knowledge on what was perceived to be international best practice in the area of competence centres (interviews 3-2, 3-5). The study visits also led to the building of an international network of experts, which was accessed by the TIG staff.
Indeed one instance in which the TIG personnel made use of these international contacts 
Policy and Political Learning
Knowledge flows can be observed for the creation of the K+ Programme on the international as well as on the national level. An example from the early history of the K+ Programme on the national level are the meetings of the group consisting of ministry officials and policy experts setting up the original K+ policy papers with representatives from science and the economy. As has been pointed out, these meetings took place at a time when the central part of the policy paper and the programme had already been in existence. The meetings had a twofold purpose: First, they were to get a feedback on the proposed programme by the two core communities, science and industry. Second, the meetings should legitimise the process leading to the new and relatively large as well as quite innovative policy programme.
Given that according to an interview partner (interview 3-5) the original policy paper was not crucially changed due to this discussion processes, it seems fair to say that the legitimation was at least as important as was the feed-back function.
Indeed two reasons come to mind why such a legitimation might have been of increased importance for the political process leading up to the K+ Programme. First, the proposed policy programme was radically different from other policy measures implemented in Austria by the end of the 1990ies. It was not the policy goal of bringing together science and industry to cooperate more closely, but it was the way in which this cooperation was to be achieved that was so new. The competence centres were not only larger than most of the hitherto existing Austrian RTD centres, not only were they to be terminated after seven years, they also were to be closely monitored through their lifetime. And perhaps most important of all, the way in which they should be selected formed the very centre of the policy paper advancing the programme, making the selection and evaluation procedures the centres had to run through very strictly based upon preconceived criteria.
Second, the way in which the policy idea came into existence and the following policy document was drafted was quite unusual for Austrian RTD policy making. As has been pointed out afore, neither were the social partners granted a privileged position in the discussion process, nor were other ministries asked for their opinion -a procedure which was common practice and which under the specific circumstances of the Austrian RTD policy structures -lack of funding, unclear responsibilities, little interest from politicians -was quite cumbersome and partially responsible for stifling the creation of innovative policy instruments during much of the 1990ies. In light of previous experiences with policy initiatives, the way in which the K+ Programme was conceived could be seen as a form of political learning.
Different from the term policy learning, political learning relates to strategies of "selling" a political measure (May 1992 ).
Learning at the Operational Level
Another incidence of learning at an early stage of the K+ Programme was the pilot phase of the K+ Programme, which started during 1998, when in a first evaluation round five centres were chosen which were to enable the newly founded agency TIG to gather experiences with the new policy programme. Several interview partners agreed that this was the case:
Whilst administrative routines were carried out in a very strict kind of fashion during the first months and years of the programme, there soon was a smoothing of administrative routines, which became established social practices over the course of the following years (interview The assessment exercises fostered learning in different forms. First, already the fact that an evaluation-like analysis of the competence centre programmes was made forced policy actors from ministries as well as intermediary agencies to look back and reflect upon their role in the policy programmes and their work in the first years of these measures. These reflective activities often took on the form of a quasi-binding character, since they were done in a semi-public way, interviews to be transcribed, in statements to be taken up into the assessment reports or in reactions to the expert's reports in workshops, where other policy actors would take notice of them.
Second, the interactions of policy makers took on a different character since they were structured by a planned common activity, i.e. the assessment exercise, entailing the aforementioned workshops and an itinerary with milestones. Policy makers from different ministries who were barely communicating with each other due to antagonistic relationships, now had to interact in one way or another.
Third, the mixture of outsiders to the Austrian RTD system, the experts from the German
Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, and insiders, from the Austrian KMU Research, helped to provide the team carrying out this study a more neutral position, acceptable to all actors taking part in the process. Social Learning took place when high-ranking ministry officials began to communicate with each other. Instrumental learning happened when the competence centre programmes were discussed with their strengths and weaknesses in a way that did not exclude or let alone stigmatise some of the discussants. Both forms of learning were interdependent with social learning being a logical predecessor of instrumental learning in this case. The already existing antagonisation of the two involved ministries' leading civil servants had reached into some of the competence centres, where actors held the belief that one or the other ministry and one or the other programme were to be preferred over the other. Through the process of the assessment this polarization was already weakened. The workshop in which the assessment report was discussed finally broke the ice. This establishment of a working-relationship between the two leading ministry officials started a discussion process, which, if over a prolonged period of time, led to a concentration of management functions in the same FFG unit and to plans to reform the competence centre programmes and create a single programme with different programme lines.
Policy Entrepreneurs
Despite the long-standing interest of social science in political leadership, there has been relatively little interest in integrating works on leadership (Lasswell 1950 , Pelinka 1997 ) into the literature interested in policy learning. All of these activities are typical for policy entrepreneurs. Richard Rose points out that "policy entrepreneurs combine commitment to programme goals with long service in government … are usually very well informed about the substance and the politics of programmes. Their concern with a special subject … leads them to build up a nation-wide or international network of contacts that are a source of ideas for new programmes and of evidence to support the lessons that they choose to draw." (Rose 1993, 56; Mayer/Lassnigg 2006) . here. Yet the network did not only have the role of being a knowledge repository for the policy entrepreneur, but it was also used in order to rally support for the new policy measure.
Roberts emphasizes that policy entrepreneurs not only have a role in the facilitation of policy 6 Exceptions are Richard Rose (1993) and Nancy Roberts (1998) . Leadership barely plays a role for the literature interested in policy learning, which is based on neo-institutionalism. This otherwise fruitful school of thought (Hall/Taylor 1996 , Peters 1999 ) focuses on the effects of institutions and norms, values and rules they are based upon, often at the cost of ignoring the role of individuals.
learning, but that their role also is inherently political. They are "mindful of the political realities, they are concerned with framing their ideas in the best possible light in order to attract and expand their base of support, their strategies and tactics are designed to overcome resistance … and sell power-holders on the merits of their ideas. Building a coalition and keeping it focused on their policy objective is a priority, not just through policy formulation, but also through implementation and evaluation." (Roberts 1998, 115) Regarding the political strategies of framing the policy problem, which would necessitate a competence centre programme and building a coalition favouring such a programme the working group drafting the policy paper upon which the K+ Programme should rest, included not only a number of key-actors such as the social partners and intermediary funding agencies. Also a member of the science minister's cabinet was present from time to time, who not only served as a liaison to the minister, but later also became the head of TIG.
The policy entrepreneur in the introduction of the K+ Programme had a crucial domain knowledge about the policy field and the administrative units involved in the creation and carrying out of the programme. Yet it might have been helpful that he was not a longstanding insider of one of the ministries, having changed between different ministries inside the policy subsystem, thus being able to combine insight and outside views. Yet it is also important not to paint an overly rational picture of the policy process analysed here as there was a clear element of chance involved, too. At least as important as the above factors was the availability of a policy window, which was opened by an increasing dissatisfaction with the available policy instruments in the RTD policy sub field. And even more so, the existence of a minister, who upon reflection of the fact that most of his energy was consumed by transport policies, was ready to give much leeway to civil servants without shying away from necessary decisions, when they were asked for by his cabinet.
Conclusions
The main focus of the paper was to answer the question why a radical policy innovation such as the K+ Programme was possible in the Austrian RTD policy subsystem, which in the decade before had rejected changes for a prolonged period of time. It could be established that the K+ Programme indeed was innovative for Austria. The policy initiative was quite large for Austrian terms and it was more based on formal criteria than any top-down RTD policy measure in existence before, with all the targets of the policy set ex ante.
Moreover the K+ Programme was highly internationalised: It was set up under consideration of similar programmes in other OECD countries, namely Australia, Canada and Sweden.
From begin on the main instrument for the selection of competence centres was the utilization of international peer reviewers. Also the MAP Projects originated from TIG, the agency managing the K+ Programme. As has been laid out, the MAP Projects were an instrument to compare the K+ Programme with similar international policy measures. before. An important reason for the fast establishment of the K+ Programme was that a sizeable part of the Austrian RTD system was unsatisfied with the at that time largest
Austrian RTD policy instrument, the ITF. The lack of political steering, the cooperation problems between the different ministries and other actors and the lack of funding made the ITF an inefficient policy instrument in the eyes of a number of policy actors.
It was precisely the lack of funding, a key component of Austrian RTD policy over most of the 1980ies and 1990ies, which the new K+ Programme in 1998 had not to face. The funds from the privatisation of the Austrian Federal Railways (ÖBB) glass-fibre network saved the policy actors proposing the programme from having to combine funds from different sources in order to be able to activate the programme. For many other Austrian RTD policy initiatives programme administrators and civil servants had to collect funding on a yearly basis in order to keep the programmes running, if often at a minimal level.
The above mentioned reasons made it easier for the young policy entrepreneur from the Ministry for Science and Transport to push the programme. The effort to build a coalition for the new programme was also eased by the fact that a single programme caused much less upheaval than a major policy reform such as the one which had caused so much discussion in 1997: it could be "sold" much easier to the RTD policy community. The availability of funds and the fact that major actors did not see their interests endangered created a window of opportunity for the establishment of a policy innovation such as the K+ Programme, which could be used by a determined policy entrepreneur who was willing to invest time and energy into the creation of the K+ Programme.
Another task of the paper was the analysis of the K+ Programme through the perspective of a policy learning approach. It was found that learning indeed played an important role in the establishment, implementation and evaluation of this competence centre programme.
Already in the early phases of problem definition the role of international and national experts has been found to be important, with the policy documents leading to the K+ Programme referring to the national innovation systems approach. As part of the decision finding and making processes experiences from other countries were used to set up the new policy initiative in Austria. Furthermore a co-evolution of the still young national RTD policy field and an increasingly internationalising Austrian community of experts has been proposed. The Austrian competence centre programmes and to the idea of establishing a new programme, which should replace the older ones and focus them in one policy instrument. 
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